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Thank you—to Nichibunken for choosing the Nordic countries as the venue for this year’s 
conference, to the presenters for sharing your research with us, and to the audience for showing 
an interest and hopefully posing stimulating questions.
We can look forward to a broad array of topics over the course of this day, ranging from 
aspects of medieval to modern, hard-core Buddhism to reflections of sacredness or spirituality 
in cultural forms that appear a lot less specific and defined. As the moderator of this session, I 
have tried to arrange the papers in groups that, at first sight, seemed in some way related. I hope 
there will be something of particular interest to each of you; I know for a fact that there will be 
something in the category of hatsumimi for all. It follows from the nature of this conference that 
we shall be witnessing the variety and scope of research into Japanese religion within the Nordic 
countries—I trust that the lack of coherence will not prevent you from enjoying the variety of 
this day’s programme.
I have been given fifteen minutes for a so-called “mini-keynote.” Key-note is a term from 
music—apparently it means “the lowest tone or note of a scale,” with which everything else in 
a piece must be “in key.” But today’s papers are composed in many different keys, leaving me 
with an impossible task. I will therefore concentrate on keeping my keynote both low and mini.
Just months ago, the study of Japanese Religion has been enriched with a new journal: 
the Journal of Religion in Japan. The title of this Brill-initiated journal signals the ambition to 
make research on religion in Japan relevant to the field of religious studies as a whole. Japanese 
religion has, I think, been a rather rich field of study; yet its impact on theories of religion has 
been quite limited compared not only to the study of Western religions, but, arguably, also of 
other Asian traditions. This journal could offer a good opportunity to do something about this.
The first, “key-note” article of this new journal is a rallying call in exactly this direction. 
It is authored by one of the defining figures in the field, and one of few Japan specialists to 
have spread his wings beyond the Area studies arena: Ian Reader.1 With his typical f lair, he 
inaugurates the journal by declaring: “Religion may not yet be dead in Japan but it is dying.”2 
His explanation for this radical development is just as provocative: Reader argues that the 
secularization theory should be resurrected in its classical guise, and posits that the radical 
decline of religion in Japan is due to urbanization and the spread of higher education.
1	 Ian Reader. “Secularisation, R.I.P.? Nonsense! The ‘Rush Hour Away from the Gods’ and the Decline of 
Religion in Contemporary Japan.” Journal of Religion in Japan 1:1 (2012), pp. 7–36.
2	 Reader 2012, p. 34.
244
Mark Teeuwen Japanese Religion: A Terminal Patient?
I would be very interested to hear what you all think of this thesis. In studying “religion in 
Japan,” are we studying a terminal patient? Does the incumbent fate of Japanese religion prove 
that modernity-induced secularization “remains a potent force,” as Ian Reader puts it, and even, 
perhaps, that the same fate awaits religion in other modern societies across the globe?
When put like this, Ian Reader’s argument surely sounds overly naïve. The case of Japan 
does not prove that “religion” is bound to face total extinction any time soon—if only because 
other modern and modernizing nations provide convincing counter-evidence (such as the U.S., 
or countries in the Middle East and South Asia). And I won’t even start on a discussion of the 
theoretical and practical problems in pinpointing what “religion” and, even worse, “secularity” 
may mean in different contexts—other than to say that it is a long way from medieval 
Christendom, which pioneered this conceptual pair, to early modern and modern Japan.
Still, I think Reader has a point. He argues that critics of secularization theory have 
often used Japan as an example of a modern society where religion has not been threatened 
by modern secularity, and he sets out to prove that this image of a religiously vibrant Japan 
has no roots in actual reality by quoting a variety of statistics. He admits that in his earlier 
writings, he has been among those who have broadcasted an image of Japan as an exciting 
religious laboratory, and in his usual open-minded manner, he sets out to correct what he now 
sees as a mistaken perception. He is sceptical of both the so-called “religious boom” of the 
1970s and the “spirituality boom” trumpeted by the media in the 2000s. Instead, he sees a 
steady decline in the fortunes of temples in particular, but also stagnation in the activities of 
New Religions, and, most significantly, a decline in levels of self-declared “faith” (shinkō) and 
an increasingly negative perception of “religion” in public discourse.  I would have framed the 
argument differently, but I do agree with Reader that “religion” in Japan is negatively affected 
by increasing scepticism and is struggling to attract the custom on which religious institutions 
depend for their survival.
As long as I can remember, Japan has been portrayed both as strikingly secular on the one 
hand, and, at the same time, as overflowing with temples, shrines and churches of all kinds. 
Already in the 1970s, Jan Swyngedouw of Nanzan University described the question whether 
“Japan should be called a secular or religious society” as “classic.”3 The same decade saw a lively 
discussion on the effects of secularization on religious institutions in Japan; few were optimistic 
on their behalf.
Yet, looking back on my own experience of developments in northern Europe, I would 
say that religious institutions in Japan have proved remarkably robust in the face of change. In 
my city of birth, Eindhoven in the Catholic south of the Netherlands, there were fifty-seven 
churches when I was young; now there are only two left. In Japan, the number of temples has 
decreased by some 20 or 25 percent since 1970; shrines and churches may even have increased 
in number. Rural shrines are threatened by depopulation rather than secularization; most 
3	 Jan Swyngedouw. “Secularization in a Japanese Context.” JJRS 3/4 (December 1976), p. 283.
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urban shrines appear to be doing quite well, and my impression is that shrine priests have 
more confidence in the future than do temple priests. From a northern European perspective, 
we should perhaps ask not why “religion is dying,” but rather why so many Japanese religious 
institutions have managed to survive in what appears to be an environment that is increasingly 
hostile to “religion,” and why some institutions fare worse than others.
Central to the conundrum of religion in Japan has been the question of religious identity. 
Astounding numbers of Japanese temples and shrines have subsisted for a remarkable length of 
time by offering services to people who do not identify themselves with the sect or even religion 
that those temples and shrines represent. This simple and much-discussed fact has profound 
implications for a discussion about secularity in Japan, or in the many Asian countries where 
religious institutions function in similar ways.
Charles Taylor has written a fascinating work on the emergence of secularity in his classic 
A Secular Age.4 One central moment in this long saga was the movement, from the sixteenth 
century onwards, to “reform” the City of Man by applying the standards of the City of God to 
all aspects of society. This involved imposing the norms of religious life on lay people. Their 
interaction with the church was no longer limited to their depending on the mediation of 
professional priests at crucial moments in their lives; now, they had to take care to live Christian 
lives on a daily basis. Others have called the infusion of religious values and practices into all 
spheres of social life “fundamentalism,” and argued that this originally European process spread 
across the world in the nineteenth century.5 Ironically, “reform” of this kind produced both 
political forms of religious fundamentalism and secular thought—which retains the idea that 
the world can be improved towards perfection but does away with the primacy of God.
Many writers on Japanese religion have argued that in order to survive, Japanese 
religion has to follow a similar path, from lay-people’s dependence on the services of religious 
professionals to the creation of religious identities based on the notion of what Taylor calls 
“Reform.” Swyngedouw, for example, wrote that Japanese religions needed to “evolve in a 
direction based on the ethic of the universally human” and inspire “personal faith” in their 
followers on that basis.6 In the immediate post-war, Orikuchi Shinobu argued the same for 
Shinto; so did numerous Buddhist leaders for their sects. The shrine organization Jinja Honchō 
has consistently resisted this path; many Buddhist sects did embrace it, but have had limited 
success in winning over their danka. In the end, most users of religious services in Japan show 
little interest in, or actively resist adopting a religious identity, or embarking on a programme of 
personal reform.
In some way or other, this must have profound repercussions for the way Japanese religious 
institutions are affected by secularization. Losing interest in using ritual services is a very 
4	 Charles Taylor. A Secular Age. Harvard University Press, 2007.
5	 Torkel Brekke. Fundamentalism: Prophesy and Protest in an Age of Globalization. Cambridge University 
Press, 2011. 
6	 Swyngedouw 1976, p. 303.
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different thing from abandoning a religious identity. Choosing between a temple grave and 
a grave in a public cemetery may well involve questions of faith, but not necessarily. It makes 
sense to say that Norwegian parents choosing to baptise their child in a church are making a 
religious choice, and those who choose not to do so may perhaps be described as secular; but do 
the same terms apply in any meaningful way to hatsu miyamairi or shichi-go-san?
One of the main conclusions to arise from the debate on secularization is that, contrary 
to what Reader appears to be arguing, secularity comes in many shapes and forms. To my 
mind, the way Japan’s temples and shrines function does not fit in very well with most of them. 
Perhaps their future depends not on a contest between religion and secularity, but rather on 
changes in the public demand for ritual performances, and priests’ abilities to offer these in an 
attractive and effective manner. This may well explain why shrines, which are less associated 
with the problematic label of shūkyō, appear to be doing better than temples or the churches 
of New Religions. It may also explain why temples and shrines seem relatively unaffected by 
falling rates of self-declared faith, and why temples that offer only rites that suit traditional 
families are in most trouble of all.
